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Climate Change and the Rise of Terrorism in Northeastern Syria 
 






hen analyzing the rise of terrorism in Syria, foreign governments, political commentators, 
and journalists often overlook the devastating effects climate change has had in Syria’s 
already fragile biomes. The biomes of Syria mostly consist of warm and cold desert, 
except in the agriculturally vital northeastern region, where the waters from the Euphrates and Tigris 
River support a warm, semi-arid shrubland necessary for pasteurization and agriculture. In 2007, a 
five-year drought struck the country, severely devastating the lives of herders and farmers, and 
caused mass migration from the rural areas to the urban cities in hopes of finding employment and 
food. Since Bashar al-Assad’s rise to power in 2000, those living in Syria have suffered from a shift 
in its economy from the socialist policies of the Ba’ath Party to a more market-based economy with 
unequal monetary distribution, a lack of social safety networks, and an increase in prices for oil and 
agricultural fertilizers. The Assad government did little to acknowledge the plight of the farmers 
remaining in the region, leaving a power vacuum for ISIS to fill in the northeastern region of Syria, 
seizing control of scarce resources such as water and oil and using them as a weapon to control the 
populations of rural areas and populous cities such as Raqqa. 
 
Increasing Temperatures and Drought Leads to Diminishing Resources and Migration 
 
There are four distinct biomes in Syria; the eastern Mediterranean, the cold and warm deserts 
that blanket a majority of the country, and the vital warm semi-arid northeastern region that borders 
with Turkey, which produces much of the country’s agriculture (Nett & Ruttinger, 2016). This area is 
dependent on the Euphrates river basin, as it provides “65 percent of surface water supply in Syria 
and accounts for 27 percent of total land resources” (Kibaroglu & Schuemann, 2013). The countries 
surrounding the Euphrates River, Turkey, Iran, and Syria, have been competing for its resources for 
decades, creating irrigation programs in each country that began to overextend their reach (Kibaroglu 
& Schuemann, 2013). In Syria, this initiative was headed by President Hafez al-Assad and his 
military regime in order to make Syria agriculturally self-sufficient (Wendle, 2016, 52). However, as 
the years went on, and the temperatures began to increase, Syrian farmers grew to rely more heavily 
on well-digging for ground water. Kemal Ali, a Syrian who ran a well-digging company for 30 years 
explains, “Before the drought, I would have to dig 60 or 70 meters to find water…then I had to dig 
100 to 200 meters…then when the drought hit very strongly, I had to dig 500 meters. The water kept 
dropping and dropping” (Wendle, 2016). As the groundwater in Syria was dramatically declining, in 
2006, the northeastern was hit with a terrible five-year drought, spelling disaster for a region that was 
already over-farmed, over-worked, and lacked sustainable resources. The 2007-8 crop season was the 
most damaging, as levels of rainfall declined by 66 percent. Crop yields in state-irrigated areas 
declined by 32 percent, while areas dependent on rainfall for watering fell a dramatic 79 percent 
(Lister, 2015). Herders that depend on the regions dry grasslands for grazing, with 10,700 herders in 
Hasakah, 11,500 herders in Raqa, and 12,245 herders in Hama losing their source of income (Nett & 
Ruttinger, 2016). 
Without the ability to develop and sustain farmland or herd livestock, Syria experienced a 
mass rural-to-urban migration, with the most dramatic shifts seen in the north-eastern regions of al-
Hasakan, al-Raqqa, and Deir ez Zour with 60 to 70 percent of region abandoned in favor of southern 
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cities such as Damascus (Lister, 2015). As thousands flocked south, the Assad regimes did little and 
less to alleviate the economic conditions for both the farmers that remained in the northeastern 
regions, and those who were displaced searching for employment in the large cities. The urban areas 
of Syria were marked with illegal suburban settlements, and were rife with “overcrowding, poor 
infrastructure, unemployment and crime”, and were “neglected by the Assad government and became 
the heart of the developing unrest” (Wendle, 2016, 54). These climate refugees would either join the 
Free Syrian Army and rebel factions, continue on a harrowing journey to flee the nation, or become 
caught in the crossfires of civil war. Those who remained in the drought-stricken regions of the 
northeast would join forces with the Syrian Kurds, organize militias, or succumb to the newest power 
in the region, ISIS, which claimed much of the northeastern territory abandoned by the Syrian 
government and population alike. 
 
Political Instability and Civil War Allows ISIS to Expand into Syria, Capturing Remaining 
Resources 
 
 As the families who remained in the northeastern regions in Syria struggled to survive during 
the drought, political unrest in major cities such as Damascus and Deraa in the south began to surge. 
Referred to as the Arab Spring, in the spring of 2011, pro-democracy protestors took to the streets to 
demonstrate their disapproval with the Assad regime’s lack of economic action to help those in the 
drought regions and those suffering in the urban areas looking for employment. Prior to the drought, 
the economic policies of the Assad government began to shift from the social safety networks of the 
prior socialist Ba'ath governments to a more capitalistic, market economy, with returns in the 
economy favoring those at the top (Lister, 2015). The Assad government cut subsidies to farmers, 
increasing the price of oil and fertilizer in 2008 and 2009, increasing the loss of livelihoods. (Lister, 
2015). These policies coupled with a corrupt, one party state, and extreme drought led to civil unrest, 
and eventually civil war in the Southern regions of Syria, and the populous city of Aleppo. By 2014, 
conditions had broken down enough in Syria for ISIS to make their move into northeastern Syria. 
Due to the lack of population, active resistance efforts, and state infrastructure and regulation of 
Syria’s northeastern water sources, ISIS took this opportunity to seize control of the water, and 
establish social services, providing some relief to disaffected local populations (Nett & Ruttinger, 
2016). As geographer and author Harm de Blij states, “terrorist cells find refuge in remote, rugged, 
rural environs where they can blend in with the local population while operating their cells and 
preparing their attacks, especially when those environs adjoin suitable targets” (2012, 207).  
One of these targets was the city of Raqqa, which fell to ISIS in November 2013 after months 
of rebel and state military fighting. Establishing Raqqa as the de facto capital of the caliphate, ISIS 
began to carve out supply-line routes along the extremely important Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, 
claiming water resources, oil fields, energy resources, and remaining agriculture in their wake. A 
2016 report entitled “Insurgency, Terrorism, and Organised Crime in a Warming Climate” explains, 
“With resources gained from the seizure of oil fields, extortion and foreign support, the terrorist 
group financed infrastructure and state-like institutions such as the ‘Islamic Administration for Public 
Services’” which provided electricity in Aleppo (Nett & Ruttinger, 2016, 32). ISIS also established 
services for education, health services, and resource allocation to attempt to gain legitimacy in the 
northeastern regions of Syria. 
 
ISIS is Using Water as Weapon 
 
 The regions held by ISIS since mid-2015 along the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers are crucial in 
their fight against the Syrian Kurds, warring rebel and terrorist factions, and the Assad military. By 
establishing a chokehold on the water supply, ISIS can bend surrounding populations to their will 
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through extortion. In Raqqa, the “former Credit Bank has been turned into the tax authority that 
collects payments from business for electricity, water, and security” (DuBois King, 2016, 155). 
Currently, ISIS controls two dams that are essential for sustaining life in the northeastern regions of 
Syria, the Tabqa Dam, which provides water to 5 million people and is crucial for crop irrigation, and 
the Ramadi Dam, which was purposefully closed in order to more easily attack regime forces 
downstream (Nett & Ruttinger, 2016). ISIS is one the most efficient organizations in using water as a 
weapon effectively. Using methods developed in Iraq, ISIS can use dams to flood local 
neighborhoods in order to move in a gain control, can cut off water supplies used for electricity, or 
tax water supplies at high rates in order to financially control a population while providing them with 
life giving resources. 
 Access to water and other resources is also a main motivator in ISIS recruitment. Often 
targeting young men who harbor deep rooted anti-Assad sentiments, ISIS offers a life of stability in 
exchange for fighting for the Caliphate. With access to the badly needed resources such as water and 
oil that ISIS controls in Syria, and the going rate of $400 a month to fight, about 5 times the wages in 
the region, it provides the necessary economic and geographic incentives for Syrians who were once 
simple farmers, to arm themselves for the extremist Islamic group (Nett & Ruttinger, 2016). Water is 
the difference between life and death in desert laden Syria, and as temperature rise, droughts 
increase, and terrorism and war wage throughout the country, it will become the key resource to fight 
over in years and decades to come. 
 
Looking to the Future – What will Become of Syria after the War? 
 
 While the wars in Syria will one day come to an end, the impact of the 2006-2011 drought 
has changed the world as we know it. The Syrian refugee crisis has affected many countries 
throughout the world, mainly in the Middle East, Greece, and Germany. The mass migration, 
beginning with those fleeing from drought and continuing with those fleeing from war, has led to 
large parts of Syria to be completely unoccupied. Many countries harboring refugees have hope that 
one day their migrants might return to Syria, however, this remains highly unlikely. A study by the 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, predicts an increase in 
temperature by 1.1 to 3.4 degrees Celsius, and an average monthly reduction in precipitation reaching 
8-10mm mainly around the west and upper Euphrates and Tigris river basins in the East by 2100 
(United Nations, 2015). Syria falls under the category of a water scarce nation, which occurs when 
the demand for water exceeds the available amount (Cunningham & Cunningham, 2017, 382). Since 
much of Syria is covered in cold or warm desert, the remaining grasslands in the northeastern regions 
may be prone to desertification with continued droughts, increased temperatures, and its close 
proximity to the Hadley cells, which distribute winds that would carry the dry desert soils into the 
more temperate biomes. Soil degradation due to drought, overgrazing, over-farming, and improper 
water management over the past 40 years in Syria severely diminishes the crop yield and quality of 
crops raised. 
 The UN study also shows that while rises temperatures will lead to more drought, it will also 
lead to more extreme weather conditions such as heat waves, sandstorms, and flash floods, which are 
just as devastating (2015). With correct water management and farming techniques, those who 
remain in Syria’s northeastern regions may be able to adapt to more localized sustainable farms. 
However, with the occurrence of sand storms or flash floods, an entire crop yield can be demolished 
within a matter of hours. The United Nation also reports that while the Arab region is responsible for 
less carbon dioxide emissions than the average developed nation, the Mediterranean Sea is more 
vulnerable to greenhouse gases. Columbia University’s Richard Seager states, “There’s something  
3
Wilson: Climate Change and the Rise of Terrorism
Published by DigitalCommons@COD, 2017
130 
specific about the Mediteranean that is making it hydrologically very sensitive to rising greenhouse 
gases” (Wendle, 2016, 55). Even with the eradication of war, Syria has many more climate issues to 
face as a nation, and will not be able to do so in its current political climate. 
 
Combatting Climate Change in Syria: Effective Solutions that May Never be Implemented 
 
 As the war in Syria enters its sixth year, and the absence of an effective state government 
permeates, it is up to the rest of the world to take on the charge of curbing climate change. One of the 
main factors in producing carbon dioxide emissions in the Middle East is their dependence on oil 
production to move their economies. While Syria has historically been an agricultural country, since 
the 1980s, they have become more reliant on oil extraction to gain economic ground. Inorganic 
pollutants accumulating in the Mediterranean Sea, which leads directly into the Euphrates River 
combine with the agricultural runoff of the vital northeastern regions, produces a toxic mix in the 
water which transfers into the area’s soil. One of the major factors in restoring the ecosystem of the 
semi-arid northeast is to ensure the cleanliness of the water coming through the Euphrates and Tigris 
Rivers. This would require the Syrian government to create water management facilities that do not 
extend their boundaries like those created in the 1970s, and create legislation similar to that of the 
Clean Water Act of 1972, which aimed to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” (Cunningham & Cunningham, 2016, 420). 
 The need for sustainable energy will also be a major problem for the people of Syria. With 
the Assad government ending subsidies for oil for farmers, the dependence on oil throughout the 
entire Arab nation will need to shift as we reach the global oil peak. Since water is scarce, 
transitioning to wind or solar energy in the dry deserts of Syria might be the best way to obtain 
energy in the future. However, once again, this takes government participation and action to even 
consider. Syria is currently one of three nations not signed on to the Paris Climate Accord, along with 
Nicaragua and most recently the United States, which pledges to curb manmade greenhouse gases 
such as carbon dioxide and methane in an effort to stop the climate changing by 2 degrees Celsius. 
Unless major emissions producers such as the United States, Europe, and the Arab States make the 
switch to sustainable energy, emissions will continue to rise, the Mediterranean will continue to 
capture those emissions, and, without the right leadership in the government, countries like Syria will 
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